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Abstract
Do voters judge their national economy relative to economic performance abroad?
In 2013 we took advantage of the German Bundestag election to test this hypothesis
predictively. Nearly two months prior to the election, we published an election
forecast relying on a theory-driven empirical model of election outcomes that draws
on previous election outcomes; characteristics of the government and of voters; and,
most originally, the relative economic performance of Germany (‘benchmarked”
growth) in comparison to the three other most important economies in Europe,
France, the UK and Italy. Our forecast put the outgoing coalition government
of CDU/CSU and FDP at 47.05% of the popular vote deviating from the actual
outcome of 46.3 by 0.75 points. This makes our forecast one of the most accurate
in this election cycle. Despite one and a half months of lead time, our forecast
performed on par or slightly better than the last poll results issued only two days
before the election.
∗Authors’ note: We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions by Michael Bolle, Thomas
Gschwend and Simon Munzert, as well as colloquium participants at the Jean Monet Centre, Free Uni-
versity Berlin, conference participants at the ‘Gemeinsame Tagung der DVPW-Arbeitskreise ‘Politik und
Kommunikation’ und ‘Wahlen und politische Einstellungen’: Die Bundestagswahl 2013”, Wissenschaft-
szentrum Berlin, and participants at the conference ‘Election Studies: Reviewing the Bundestagswahl
2013”, Center for Advanced Studies, LMU Munich, organized by Andreas Graefe.
†Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, e-mail: kayser@hertie-school.org
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‘Forecasts are difficult – especially if they concern the future.’1
– Karl Valentin
1 Introduction
Predictive validity is a cornerstone of science, more difficult to achieve than explanation2
and correspondingly all too often neglected in the social sciences.3 In the run-up to the
German federal election of 2013, forecasts and prognostications about who would win
attracted considerable attention, both within Germany and beyond. We entered the fray,
using it as an opportunity to test a recent hypothesis about how voters form economic
evaluations about government performance.
The economy perennially serves as one of the most important determinants of electoral
outcomes4 but precisely how voters form their economic assessments is less clear. Re-
cently,5 claimed, and6 experimentally confirmed – in the case of Denmark and Sweden
– that voters judge national economic performance in comparison to that abroad. Such
effects emerge in observational data because the media report more positively on the
domestic economy when it outdistances its neighbors. Both the observational and ex-
perimental data of these respective studies, however, sought explanation rather than
prediction. Here we offer a different test, an election forecast estimated two months prior
to the 2013 Bundestag election based on a spartan model of voting behavior that in-
1‘Prognosen sind schwierig – vor allem, wenn sie die Zukunft betreffen” quote ascribed to German
cabaret artist Karl Valentin (1882-1948)
2Carl G Hempel. ‘Explanation and prediction by covering laws’. In: Philosophy of science: The
Delaware seminar. Vol. 1. New York: Wiley. 1963, pp. 107–33.
3Alexander Rosenberg. Economics–Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1992; Philip A Schrodt. ‘Seven deadly sins of contemporary quantitative
political analysis’. In: Journal of Peace Research 51.2 (2014), pp. 287–300; Milton Friedman. ‘The
methodology of positive economics’. In: Essays in positive economics 3.3 (1953).
4Richard Nadeau, Michael S Lewis-Beck and Éric Bélanger. ‘Economics and elections revisited’. In:
Comparative Political Studies 46.5 (2013), pp. 551–573.
5Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. ‘Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability
and the Necessity of Comparison’. In: American Political Science Review 106.03 (Aug. 2012), pp. 661–
684.
6Kasper M. Hansen, Asmus L. Olsen and Mickael Beck. ‘Cross-national Yardstick Comparisons: A
Choice Experiment on a Forgotten Voter Heuristic’. In: Political Behavior (2013), p. xxx.
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corporates only benchmarked (i.e., comparative) economic growth, previous vote share,
terms in office and partisan identification. To set our results in the context of what con-
stitutes an accurate prediction, we contrast our model’s performance with other forecasts
and polls,7 also ‘post-predicting” past elections out of sample and calculating average
prediction error.
There are many ways to forecast an election. Leaving casual punditry aside, prognostic-
ators can turn to structural models, survey polling – asking respondents whom they will
vote for or who they think will win – political betting markets, poll averaging techniques
and more recently, synthetic models8 that mix structural forecasts and polls. The 2013
Bundestag election saw a welcome expansion in the number of election forecasts in a
country that has historically had few.9 In contrast to many of the other forecasts, we
constructed a structural forecasting model that made no attempt at improving meth-
ods10; rather we employed simple linear regression with some of the most conventional
vote-choice predictors identified in electoral research. We added only a single innovation
intended to test whether voters use cross-national comparisons to assess the economy: in
place of economic growth, we employed the deviation in German real GDP growth from
that of its largest European benchmarks, the UK, France and Italy.
7As we address below, polls are snapshots in time (Will Jennings and Christopher Wlezien. ‘The
Timeline of Elections: A Comparative Perspective’. In: American Journal of Political Science [Forth-
coming 2015]) rather than predictions of outcomes on election day. We account for this by evaluating
our forecast in comparison to polls taken shortly before (usually two days prior to) the election
8Robert S Erikson and Christopher Wlezien. ‘Forecasting US presidential elections using economic
and noneconomic fundamentals’. In: PS: Political Science & Politics 47.02 (2014), pp. 313–316; Michael
S Lewis-Beck and Ruth Dassonneville. ‘Forecasting elections in Europe: Synthetic models’. In: Research
& Politics 2.1 (2015), p. 2053168014565128.
9The notable exception are (Thomas Gschwend and Helmut Norpoth. ‘”Wenn am nächsten Sonntag
...”: Ein Prognosemodell für Bundestagswahlen’. In: Wahlen und Wähler: Analysen aus Anlass der
Bundestagswahl 1998. Ed. by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Max Kaase. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 2001, pp. 473–499) and (Bruno Jérôme, Véronique Jérôme-Speziari and Michael S. Lewis-Beck.
A political-economy forecast for the 2009 German elections (September 27): The end of the Grand
Coalition? 2009) whose Chancellor and Political Economy models were the only the only serious
forecasts for several elections.
10cf., for example, Peter Selb and Simon Munzert. Forecasting the 2013 Bundestag Election Using
Data from Various Polls. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2313845. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research
Network, Aug. 2013; Andreas Graefe et al. ‘Combining forecasts: An application to elections’. In:
International Journal of Forecasting 30.1 (Jan. 2014), pp. 43–54; Bruno Jérôme, Véronique Jérôme-
Speziari and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. ‘A Political-Economy Forecast for the 2013 German Elections:
Who to Rule with Angela Merkel?’ In: PS: Political Science & Politics 46.03 (June 2013), pp. 479–480.
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More specifically, our forecast, released in early August 2013,11 relies on a theory-driven
forecasting model of election outcomes that draws on previous election outcomes; char-
acteristics of the government and of voters; and, most originally, the relative economic
performance of Germany (‘benchmarked’ growth). It put the outgoing coalition govern-
ment of CDU/CSU and FDP at roughly 47.05% of the popular vote, 12 overshooting
the actual result by just .75 percentage points. This compares rather favorably to the
last poll results issued only two days before the election as well as to other forecast-
ing models. When we consider the average out-of-sample prediction error of the nine
most recent Bundestag elections – single forecasts can, of course, be misleading – our
benchmarking model also outperforms other models, including an identical model using
non-benchmarked growth.
Forecasting models have already made important theoretical contributions to electoral
research. Most notably, the volatility of political polls over a campaign contrasts sharply
with the ability of of fundamentals-based structural models to predict outcomes months
ahead of an election. This has highlighted the often ephemeral effects of events in elec-
tion campaigns and led to insights into when and how voters receive information and
form voting preferences.13 As elections near, they both pay more attention and weight
‘fundamentals” such as the economy more heavily.14 As15 points out, election forecasting
has contributed greatly to our understanding of the retrospective nature of the economic
vote. We hope that forecasts can similarly contribute to fundamental insights on the
effect of cross-national economic benchmarking on vote choice.
11FOCUS Online. Forscher sagen voraus: Union und FDP erreichen bei der Wahl exakt 47,05 Prozent.
Aug. 2013.
12As originally reported in our early August forecast (ibid.).
13Jennings and Wlezien, ‘The Timeline of Elections: A Comparative Perspective’.
14Andrew Gelman and Gary King. ‘Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So
Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?’ In: British Journal of Political Science 23 (1993), pp. 409–
451.
15William G. Mayer. ‘What, If Anything, Have We Learned from Presidential Election Forecasting?’
en. In: PS: Political Science & Politics 47.02 (Apr. 2014), pp. 329–331.
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2 Benchmarking and the Economic Vote
The effect of the economy on the vote is one of the most researched relationships in
the study of politics. Scholars, using a broad variety of objective economic variables as
well as surveys of perceived economic performance have assembled strong evidence across
national and institutional contexts demonstrating that voters punish the party in power
when the economy sours but reward it when the economy expands.16 Careful estimates
associate a unit change in economic growth with between a .8 and 1.4 percentage point
increase in the incumbent party’s vote share.17
Yet, for all of the scholarly confidence about the economic vote, considerable uncertainties
remain about how it arises and manifests itself.18 How do voters attribute responsibility
to specific governing parties?19 Do they punish governments more for downturns than
they reward them for expansions?20 How do institutions and political arrangements that
clarify or obfuscate party responsibility for outcomes influence attribution and voting?21
16Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger, ‘Economics and elections revisited’; Raymond M. Duch and
Randy Stevenson. The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election
Results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
17Michael Becher and Michael Donnelly. ‘Economic Performance, Individual Evaluations, and the
Vote: Investigating the Causal Mechanism’. In: The Journal of Politics 75.04 (Aug. 2013), pp. 968–979.
18Christopher J. Anderson. ‘The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of
Democratic Accountability’. In: Annual Review of Political Science 10.1 (2007), pp. 271–296; Mark A.
Kayser. ‘The Elusive Economic Vote’. In: Comparing Democracies 4. Ed. by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard
G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014.
19David Fortunato and Randolph T Stevenson. ‘Performance Voting and Knowledge of Cabinet Com-
position’. In: Electoral Studies 32 (2013), pp. 517–523; Raymond Duch and Randolph Stevenson. ‘Voter
perceptions of agenda power and attribution of responsibility for economic performance’. In: Electoral
Studies 32 (2013), pp. 512–516.
20Stuart N. Soroka. ‘Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic Information’. In:
Journal of Politics 68.2 (May 2006), pp. 372–385; Piero Stanig. ‘Political Polarization in Retrospective
Economic Evaluations During Recessions and Recoveries ?’ In: Electoral Studies 32.4 (2013), pp. 729–
745.
21Cameron D. Anderson. ‘Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-
Level Analysis’. In: American Journal of Political Science 50.2 (Apr. 2006), pp. 449–463; Timothy
Hellwig. ‘Constructing Accountability’. In: Comparative Political Studies 45.1 (Jan. 2012), pp. 91–118;
Sara Hobolt, James Tilley and Susan Banducci. ‘Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion
conditions performance voting’. In: European Journal of Political Research (2012); Bingham G. Powell
and Guy D. Whitten. ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political
Context’. In: American Journal of Political Science 37.2 (1993), pp. 391–414.
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Do voters’ abilities22 and partisanship23 influence their response to economic change? Do
voters hold governing parties accountable for developments, economic and other, beyond
the government’s control?24
One fundamental issue is how voters evaluate the economy in the first place. A growth
rate of two percent would be welcomed as strong growth in much of Europe today but
looks anemic in the context of historic growth rates of earlier decades and would con-
stitute an economic crisis in contemporary China.25 addressed this issue eloquently with
respect to comparisons over time but it is only recently that scholars have considered
how the performance of foreign economies affects voters assessment of their own. Cross-
jurisdiction benchmarking has been an established empirical regularity in the study of
economic policies, especially tax rates, at least since the seminal work on ‘yardstick com-
petition” by.26 Only recently, however, has it gained attention in empirical voting studies
when27 demonstrated that benchmarked growth – the deviation in the growth rate from
that of comparison countries – predicts the vote for lead governing parties more strongly
than non-decomposed growth.
28 had already argued that voters are sufficiently informed to compare the variance in eco-
nomic outcomes across countries when assessing governmental performance and, indeed,29
22Brad T. Gomez and J. Matthew Wilson. ‘Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Com-
parative Analysis of Four Democratic Electorates’. In: American Journal of Political Science 50.1 (Jan.
2006), pp. 127–145.
23Mark Andreas Kayser and Christopher Wlezien. ‘Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship
and the economic vote’. In: European Journal of Political Research 50.3 (May 2011), pp. 365–394;
Andrew Eggers. ‘Partisanship and Electoral Accountability : Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal’.
In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science (2015).
24Andrew J. Healy, Neil Malhotra and Cecilia H. Mo. ‘Irrelevant events affect voters’ evaluations
of government performance’. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107.29 (July 2010),
pp. 12804–12809; Timothy T. Hellwig. ‘Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Vot-
ing’. In: Journal of Politics 63.4 (2001), pp. 1141–62.
25Harvey D. Palmer and Guy D. Whitten. ‘The Electoral Impact of Unexpected Inflation and Economic
Growth’. In: British Journal of Political Science 29.04 (1999), pp. 623–639.
26Timothy Besley and Anne Case. ‘Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick
Competition’. In: The American Economic Review 85.1 (1995), pp. 25–45.
27Kayser and Peress, ‘Benchmarking across Borders’.
28Ray Duch and Randy Stevenson. ‘The Global Economy, Competency and the Economic Vote’. In:
Journal of Politics 72 (2010), pp. 105–123.
29Hansen, Olsen and Beck, ‘Cross-national Yardstick Comparisons: A Choice Experiment on a For-
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have shown in an experimental setting that when voters are informed of a comparison
country’s performance, they use it as a benchmark for holding their own governing parties
accountable.,30 however, are more skeptical of voter information levels and show, using
data from the Times of London that the press reports more positively on the economy
when it outperforms that of other countries, raising the possibility of ‘pre-benchmarking’.
Voters need not know anything about the performance of other economies so long as me-
dia reports on the economy influence their vote. Using a dataset of 32 newspapers from
16 countries in six languages31 indeed show that the effect of economic growth (but not
of inflation or unemployment) on the vote is heavily mediated by media reporting.
Such results are encouraging but the social science are littered with false positives32 and
the danger of confirmation bias33 lurks for scholars in all areas. Prediction offers an
alternative means to test for cross-national benchmarking in the economic vote and the
run-up to the 2013 Bundestag election offered promising conditions. The rate of real
GDP growth in Germany in the months prior to the election (.8% in the second and
.3% in the third quarter)34 was low compared to prior periods nevertheless higher than
the average of other large European economies still suffering from the aftermath of the
Financial Crisis, the Euro Crisis and/or fiscal austerity. If German voters judged the
economy only in absolute terms or in comparison to past growth, one would expect cross-
nationally benchmarked growth to emerge as a significantly weaker predictor than simple
real GDP growth and the forecasting model to predict the outcomes poorly. If they
indeed respond to relative growth, then benchmarked growth should predict the vote
more strongly than non-benchmarked growth and the model should predict the election
gotten Voter Heuristic’.
30Kayser and Peress, ‘Benchmarking across Borders’.
31Mark Andreas Kayser and Michael Peress. ‘The Media Mediates: How Voters Learn about the
Economy’. In: Working Paper (2015).
32Stephan Choudoin, Jude Hays and Raymond Hicks. ‘Do we really know that the WTO cures
cancer? False positives and the effects of international institutions’. In: Paper presented at the 8th
annual conference on the Political Economy of International Institutions, Berlin (2015).
33Raymond S Nickerson. ‘Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises.’ In: Review
of general psychology 2.2 (1998), p. 175.
34Federal Statistical Office. Seasonally adjusted quarterly results using Census X-12-ARIMA and
BV4.1. 2015.
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accurately. Of course, what constitutes accurate prediction must itself be benchmarked
against other predictions. We therefore survey other forecasting models next.
3 Other forecasting models
Electoral forecasting of the sort presented here, just like polling, originated in the context
of US presidential elections. While a small cottage industry has developed a variety of
models that perform rather well in the United States (see, for example, the 13 forecasts
in the October 2012 issue of PS: Political Science and Politics) election forecasting in
Germany is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, it is striking that to the best of our knowledge
our ‘benchmarking’ model was only the third model to be proposed for forecasting the
2013 German federal election – the others being the ‘Chancellor model’ first proposed
by35 who also provide a prediction for the upcoming election36 and a ‘Political Economy
Model’ by.3738 released a fourth forecast a bit later than ours.
Election forecasting in Germany was pioneered by.3940 Their forecasts provide a three-
months lead and they have a very good track record predicting the 2002, 2005 and
2009 elections. In 2002 they forecast the outgoing red-green government vote share
exactly right. Their model includes chancellor support (percentage of people favoring
the chancellor over his or her challenger), long-term partisanship (average of past three
election results of coalition parties) and the log of the number of terms the chancellor’s
party has been in government. Estimating their model over all past 16 elections and
35Gschwend and Norpoth, ‘”Wenn am nächsten Sonntag ...”: Ein Prognosemodell für Bundestagswah-
len’.
36Helmut Norpoth and Thomas Gschwend. ‘Chancellor Model Picks Merkel in 2013 German Election’.
In: PS: Political Science & Politics 46.03 (June 2013), pp. 481–482.
37Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck, ‘A Political-Economy Forecast for the 2013 German Elec-
tions’.
38Selb and Munzert, Forecasting the 2013 Bundestag Election Using Data from Various Polls.
39Gschwend and Norpoth, ‘”Wenn am nächsten Sonntag ...”: Ein Prognosemodell für Bundestagswah-
len’.
40(Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck, A political-economy forecast for the 2009 German elections
(September 27): The end of the Grand Coalition? ) have also developed a forecasting model for German
elections that they have used to forecast elections since 1998. They have published their forecasts in the
French press and have received little attention in Germany.
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fitting it to up-to-date data they provided not one but three slightly differing forecasts
for the 2013 election. These forecasts were, in chronological order, 51.7% vote share for
the outgoing government, published in July (but with data from April) in PS: Political
Science and Politics,41 49.7%, published on 26 July 2013 in a blog by the German weekly
Die Zeit,42 and 51.2% in another blog post on 24 August 2013.43 All forecasts were
produced using the same model, forecasts differ slightly because each time they use
updated polling data on chancellor approval. Technically, their model is similar to ours
but also their forecast is the farthest off of all models we review. They attribute this to
the unforeseen success of the Alternative für Deutschland, a eurosceptic party founded
just months before the election, and the exceptional popularity of chancellor Merkel,
which extends well beyond her own party, diminishing the predictive quality of chancellor
support.44
45 have produced many forecasts of different national elections. For 2013 they presented
a new ‘Political Economy Model.’ They use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
model to estimate the vote shares of all parties represented in parliament. Their variable
choice is also informed by electoral research and includes an economic measure like un-
employment but also political variables like chancellor approval as well as vote intention
polls. Their forecast of the coalition’s vote share is on par with ours but their estimates
for the opposition are slightly off. Their economic predictors are measured one to two
quarters before the election whereas some of their other political predictors are in prin-
ciple measurable even farther in advance, for instance whether the FDP was an outgoing
party with the CDU. They calculated their forecast in April 2013 using vote intention
41Norpoth and Gschwend, ‘Chancellor Model Picks Merkel in 2013 German Election’.
42Zeit Blog. ‘Zweitstimme: Kanzlermodell sagt Wiederwahl von Merkel voraus’. In:
http://blog.zeit.de/zweitstimme/2013/07/26/kanzlermodell-sagt-wiederwahl-von-merkel-voraus/ (July
2013).
43Zeit Blog. ‘Zweitstimme: Mach’s noch einmal, Mutti’. In:
http://blog.zeit.de/zweitstimme/2013/08/24/machs-noch-einmal-mutti/ (Aug. 2013).
44Helmut Norpoth and Thomas Gschwend. ‘A Near Miss for the Chancellor Model’. In: EUSA: EU
Political Economy Bulletin 17 (2014), pp. 4–8.
45Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck, ‘A Political-Economy Forecast for the 2013 German Elec-
tions’.
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polls available at the time (used to forecast vote shares of the Green Party, Die Linke
and the combined vote share of all other parties) which gives their model a lead of about
five months.
Selb and Munzert’s46 approach is similar to the above mentioned ones in using data from
prior elections to arrive at a forecast well ahead of the election. They differ in that
they exclusively rely on polling data. However by estimating the relationship between
pre-election polling and actual results they hope to eliminate the biases inherent in pre-
election polling which might be party- or polling-company specific and therefore arrive
at a more accurate forecast than the polls they use. Interestingly they find, based on
out-of-sample predictions, that they obtain the most accurate forecasts with polls taken
six months before the election. Accuracy decreases when using polls taken closer to the
election.
3.1 Polling
Polls differ markedly in technique and theory from forecasts; in fact they are atheoretical
and ahistorical. What they provide is a snapshot in time, not more and not less. Thus,
a poll, say, two months prior to an election, is not technically a forecast of the election,
although the media and voters often treat it as such.47 ‘Election-eve’ polls, however, are
much closer to predictions and, consequently, serve as a reasonable comparison for the
accuracy of our forecast.
Polling companies this year provided surprisingly accurate forecasts and substantially im-
proved their performance compared to previous elections. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for
instance, the non-profit company behind the ZDF’s ‘Politbarometer’, provided estimates
of the coalition vote share that hovered between 45 and 47 percent since May 2013 (see
Figure 4). 2013 was an exceptionally good year for polling in Germany; in prior years even
46Selb and Munzert, Forecasting the 2013 Bundestag Election Using Data from Various Polls.
47D. Sunshine Hillygus. ‘The Evolution of Election Polling in the United States’. en. In: Public
Opinion Quarterly 75.5 (Dec. 2011), pp. 962–981.
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final pre-election polls have deviated considerably from the actual result.48 recently evalu-
ated 232 pre-election polls from 1957 to 2013 and found that conventional 95% confidence
intervals only contained the actual election result 69% of the time. In the prior election
in 2009, for instance, when the outgoing government was a grand coalition between the
CDU/CSU and the SPD the final pre-election ‘Politbarometer’ overestimated both the
vote share of the CDU/CSU and the SPD leading to an error of 4.2 percentage points.
This occurred partly because they underestimated the extent of ‘vote lending’ from CDU
to FDP – CDU supporters giving their second vote (‘Zweitstimme’) to the FDP.49 They
made no such mistake this time providing reasonable estimates for both CDU/CSU and
FDP. This might be due to improved methodology, however, the reform of the appor-
tionment system which eliminates the so-called ‘Überhangmandate’ and therewith any
electoral advantage of ticket splitting may have been more important in this regard. All
point predictions from polls suggested an FDP vote share of 5% or more, while the FDP,
in fact, fell just below the 5% hurdle. The actual result for the FDP, however, is within
the poll’s margin of error.
4 Our model
Election forecasting in multi-party systems with proportional representation entails unique
challenges, these include multiple parties, coalition governments and strategic and mech-
anic effects of electoral thresholds. Most people are interested in forecasts because they
want to know who will win the election. However, in a multi-party system like Germany’s
the identity of the winner also depends on the outcome of post-election coalition bargain-
ing. Since it is difficult to predict winners or losers, it makes sense to focus rather on
parties’ vote shares, a determinant of the set of feasible governing coalitions. Specifically,
48Rainer Schnell and Marcel Noack. ‘The Accuracy of Pre-Election Polling of German General Elec-
tions’. In: methods, data, analyses 8.1 (2014), pp. 5–24.
49These might be better described as ‘rental votes’ (Michael F. Meffert and Thomas Gschwend. ‘Stra-
tegic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria’. In: Electoral Studies. Special Symposium: Voters and
Coalition Governments 29.3 [Sept. 2010], pp. 339–349).
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we focus on the vote share (to be) obtained by the outgoing governing coalition. The
coalition vote share is the percentage of the popular vote received by the parties forming
the governing coalition. This is usually the sum of the vote shares of two or more parties
– only once (in 1961) has Germany seen an outgoing single party government and even
then only when one counts the CDU and CSU as one party. We focus on the coalition’s
vote share, rather than on that of individual parties, because it is of the greatest sub-
stantive interest. With this forecast, we are able to predict whether the same government
will continue in power.
We thus make the assumption that a governing coalition wants to and will stay in power
if it secures the necessary votes to re-capture a parliamentary majority. Grand coalitions
are the exception here. They are mere coalitions of necessity (‘Staatsräson’) when no
other options involving a larger and one or more smaller parties seem feasible. Usually
neither coalition partner has an interest in continuing the coalition beyond the next
election. Furthermore, voters have no credible alternative government in opposition.
Our modeling choice – to use only the larger party’s vote share – was therefore motivated
by theory. The larger party in both of Germany’s grand coalitions (1969 and 2009) was
the CDU/CSU. For reasons we discuss further below our time-series is limited to 1980-
2013 and therefore only includes the latter. When faced with a coalition government,
voters attribute responsibility primary to the party of the prime minister,50 which in
Germany has always been is the larger coalition partner. Norpoth and Gschwend in their
forecasting model also rely on the larger party’s vote share for the same reasons.
Common predictors of a government’s electoral fortune work well for a time-series com-
posed of ‘regular’ coalitions and the larger party of a grand coalition but not if the full
vote share of a grand coalition is used. An alternative would be to use the grand coalition
vote share but include a grand coalition dummy variable. However, as our time-series
only contains one grand coalition, the dummy simply captures the difference in expec-
50Duch and Stevenson, The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Elec-
tion Results; Duch and Stevenson, ‘Voter perceptions of agenda power and attribution of responsibility
for economic performance’.
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ted outcomes between grand-coalition and regular governments. In effect removing the
grand coalition from our time-series seems rather arbitrary to us. It also generates a
fundamental problem for forecasting models. If we were to forecast an election result
given an outgoing grand coalition – which is in fact what the situation will be in 2017
– our estimate would also be based on a model containing a coefficient that is based on
solely the deviation of one single election.
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Four explanatory variables appear in our model: (1) the vote share received by the current
governing parties in the previous election, (2) the proportion of people identifying with
one of the governing parties, (3) the difference between Germany’s growth rate and the
‘benchmark’, i.e., the average of the growth rates in France, the UK and Italy, and (4)
the (log of the) number of terms a government has been in power. See Figure 1 for plots
of our dependent variable against our predictors. With the exception of the economic
benchmarking variable, an innovation for an election forecasting model, we chose these
variables for their broad acceptance as predictors of the vote in the voting literature.
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We include the vote share of the current incumbent parties in the previous election (even
if they were not in government then) to form a baseline prediction. Past outcomes are
a strong predictor of future outcomes, so controlling for previous vote share effectively
focuses the other predictors on changes from the previous vote share. The combined vote
share of the parties making up the outgoing government correlates strongly with their
results in the previous election (r = 0.88). This is also because many people exhibit
strong partisanship, leading them to vote for the same party in successive elections.
Our second variable, party identification, captures the proportion of respondents express-
ing an attachment with one of the governing parties. Our data come from the Politbaro-
meter.51 The question put to respondents reads (our own translation), ‘Many people in
Germany lean toward a certain party, although they might vote for a different party from
time to time. What about you? Do you – generally speaking – lean toward a certain
party?’52 Party identification does not imply a formal attachment but, rather, simply
feeling close to a party. However, since the number of people with a party identification
still changes over the medium and long term, the proportion of people identifying with
one of the governing parties correlates significantly with the vote (r = 0.61). As party
identification has declined over the years, by about .6 percentage points per year,53 so has
the vote share obtained by the outgoing government. In the US setting, partisan identi-
fication is often the strongest predictor of vote choice.54 In Europe, scholars debate its
theoretical and empirical grounding in the context of multi-party systems but empirical
51We thank the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for providing us with their 2013 aggregate party identific-
ation data.
52‘In Deutschland neigen viele Leute längere Zeit einer bestimmten politischen Partei zu, obwohl sie
auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen Sie – ganz allgemein gesprochen
– einer bestimmten Partei zu?’ If respondants answer in the affirmative they are asked for the party
they lean toward and the strength of that orientation toward the named party. We use two of the three
questions used to measure party identification in the Politbarometer survey. We do not use the third
question asking about the intensity of a citizen’s affinity to the party, that is we do not weigh respondents
by their answers to this question.
53Kai Arzheimer. ‘Mikrodeterminanten des Wahlverhaltens: Parteiidentifikation’. In: Wählerverhal-
ten in der Demokratie. Eine Einführung. Ed. by Oscar W. Gabriel and Bettina Westle. Studienkurs
Politikwissenschaft. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, pp. 223–246.
54Angus Campbell et al. The American voter: Unabridged Edition. English. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1960.
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tests have demonstrated its stability in individuals over time and its sound performance
as a predictor in voting models.55 As party identification aggregates vary from month
to month by about 3%-points due to sampling error and idiosyncratic events56 we take
the average partisan identification for the governing parties in the six months before
the given election – for an election in September this would be the months of February
through July. Since monthly party identification data is only available for the elections
from 1980 onward, we can only use elections since then in our analysis (for an overview
see Table 1).
Table 1: Elections in model
Year Outgoing Government Coalition Outgoing government vote share (%)
1980 SPD and FDP 53.5
1983 CDU/CSU and FDP 55.8
1987 CDU/CSU and FDP 53.4
1990 CDU/CSU and FDP 54.8
1994 CDU/CSU and FDP 48.4
1998 CDU/CSU and FDP 41.3
2002 SPD and Greens 47.1
2005 SPD and Greens 42.3
2009 CDU/CSU and SPD 33.8
2013 CDU/CSU and FDP 46.3 (forecast: 47.05)
The third variable is the most novel and also the namesake of our ‘benchmarking model’.
We calculate Germany’s growth, as benchmarked against the three next most important
economies in Europe: the UK, France and Italy. Data are from the World Bank’s World
Economic Outlook which goes back to 1980 and includes a forecast for 2013.57 Implicitly
by using the deviation of German growth rates from the average of British, French and
Italian growth, we presume that voters judge, albeit unwittingly, the state of the economy
55Dieter Ohr and Markus Quandt. ‘Parteiidentifikation in Deutschland: Eine empirische Fundierung
des Konzeptes auf Basis der Theorie Sozialer Identität’. In: Wählen in Deutschland. Ed. by Rüdiger
Schmitt-Beck. 1. Aufl. Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Sonderheft 45. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012,
pp. 179–202, section 2.2.
56Arzheimer, ‘Mikrodeterminanten des Wahlverhaltens: Parteiidentifikation’.
57(Mark A Kayser and Arndt Leininger. ‘Vintage Errors: Do Real-Time Economic Data Improve
Election Forecasts?’ In: Research and Politics forthcoming [2015]) show that real-time economic data
yield smaller forecast errors but in short time-series such as ours little difference between forecasts based
on vintage and real-time economic data should emerge.
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relative to that of other countries. Evidence of such ‘benchmarking across borders’ comes
from58 who explain the phenomenon with evidence that the media report more positively
on the economy when it is outperforming that of comparison countries. This measure
of relative economic performance is of special importance to the forecast for the 2013
election since German growth is sluggish but looks better when compared to that of
other European states suffering from the aftermath of the financial and Euro crises.
Indeed, of the 16 national governments up for re-election within an 18 months period
from July 2008 to the end of 2009 only nine of them lost vote share.59 Yet, their economic
performance was similarly dismal to that experienced by the OECD in general, with every
country experiencing at least two quarters of negative growth in this period and 13 of 16
experiencing negative growth in the quarter of or before the election.
Lastly, we rely on the empirical regularity that governments, on average, lose support
the longer they remain in office.60 The major governing parties (CDU/CSU or SPD) in
Germany have on average lost 3.2 percentage points per term. We capture this with the
log10 of the number of terms that a government has been in office.
4.1 Model estimates
Putting all variables in one linear regression model estimated over the elections 1980-2009
we can explain 99% of the variance in the vote share of the outgoing government in the
past 9 elections (see Table 2). An R2 of this magnitude raises worries about possibly
fitting noise but we were hesitant to change our specification due to too good a fit. All
coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected sign. Our first predictor
58Kayser and Peress, ‘Benchmarking across Borders’.
59The sample is defined as all countries that held a general election or, in the case of the United States a
presidential election, between July 2008 and December 2008, which was recorded in the election appendix
of the European Journal of Political Research.They are Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and
the United States.
60Martin Paldam. ‘The distribution of election results and the two explanations of the cost of ruling’.
In: European Journal of Political Economy 2.1 (1986), pp. 5–24; Jane Green and Will Jennings. The
Politics of Competence: The Nature and Implications of Public Opinion about Party Competence. Book
Manuscript. in progress. Chap. 5, Ch.5.
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is the ‘Previous vote share’ – the vote share obtained by the governing parties in the
prior election. Controlling for previous vote share effectively focuses the other predictors
on changes from the previous vote share: the coefficient on previous vote share is 1.025
implying that, fixing all other predictors at zero, a government should obtain roughly the
same vote share as in the previous election minus 8%-points (the constant). Of course we
cannot set all other predictors to zero. An outgoing government has to spent at least one
term in office. We include the common log of the terms in office to capture the empirical
regularity that governments, on average, lose support the longer they remain in office61
As the vote loss per term increases non-monotonically we log the variable. The coefficient
on ‘Log Terms’ is -8.881. Consequently, the expected decrease in vote share after a secon
term in office, holding all other predictors constant, would be 2.67%-points.
Party identification, as expected, has a positive sign. Party identification is a strong
predictor of the vote, so that at the aggregate the more people identify with a party
the greater a vote share it obtains - even when controlling for previous vote share. The
coefficient on party identification is positive and significant despite the fact that we include
past vote share. This indicates that party identification at the aggregate does change
over the medium term, in-between elections. Every percentage-point increase (decrease)
in party ID is associated with an increase (decrease) in vote share of roughly a fifth of a
percentage point, holding all other predictors constant.
Benchmarked growth lastly provides predictive validity for the existence of economic
voting in Germany, more specifically the benchmarking mechanism outlined by.62 A one
percentage-points difference in the growth of Germany and the average of growth rates
in France, Italy and the UK is associated with an increase in vote share of roughly one
percentage-point.
Only once we predict elections outside our sample, however, do we get an idea of our
61Paldam, ‘The distribution of election results and the two explanations of the cost of ruling’; Green
and Jennings, The Politics of Competence: The Nature and Implications of Public Opinion about Party
Competence. Book Manuscript.
62Kayser and Peress, ‘Benchmarking across Borders’.
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Table 2: A regression model of past elections to predict future elections
Predictors Coefficient (S.E.)
Previous Vote Share 1.025*** (0.0544)
Party ID 0.276** (0.0563)
Benchmarked Growth 0.930* (0.224)







Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
∗ RMSE calculated from 9 out-of-sample predictions for elections 1980 to 2009.
Note: Model estimated on elections 1980-2009
model’s predictive validity. The 2013 election provided an essential test in that regard.
In hindsight we know that it fared quite well, but when we constructed our model in
early summer 2013 we had to rely on other means to test our model’s ability to make
out-of-sample predictions. We did so with the help of out-of-sample predictions. By
omitting one election, re-estimating the model on the remaining elections and calculating
a prediction using the values of the omitted observation we ‘post-predicted’ historical
elections to test our model.63 We did this for all 9 previous elections, compared our
prediction to the actual outcome, squared the differences, averaged them and, finally,
took the square root to obtain the root mean square error (RMSE).
The RMSE gives us an estimate of the ‘average’ error of our model in out-of-sample
forecasting. Figure 3 plots the actual vote shares received by the outgoing government
against our prediction. The farthest we are off is 1.8 percentage points in 2005; in
63Due to the size of our dataset (n=9) we were not able to rely on consecutive out-of-sample forecasts
predicting one observation ahead. Instead, we predicted the omitted election using also elections following
the election to be predicted. Consequently, only our 2009 forecast is a true out-of-sample forecast into
the future. All other out-of-sample forecast predict a value within or at the beginning of the time-series
used to fit the model.
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1983 we get within one tenth of a percentage point of the actual result. The RMSE
for our model is 1.4 percentage points which, considering that the model only rests on
nine previous elections, compares rather favorably to standard errors of the regression
in surveys involving many more observations. Our coefficients remain stable across all
out-of-sample estimations showing that our results are not unduly influenced by outliers
and that the effects of our explanatory variables are, as we expected, stable over time
(Figure 2).
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4.2 Our forecast for 2013
When we regress the vote share of the outgoing government on our four explanatory
variables we obtain coefficient estimates that allow us to calculate the 2013 vote share
of the outgoing government by using up-to-date values for our explanatory variables.
Inserting 2013 values for our explanatory variables into the below equation, we obtain a
point prediction of 47.05% for the combined vote share of the CDU/CSU and FDP in
the 2013 Bundestag election.
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̂Outgoing government vote share = −8.708 + 1.025 ∗ vote share in previous election+
0.276 ∗ party identification + 0.930 ∗ benchmarked growth− 8.881(log10(terms))
Using the RMSE calculated from our ‘out-of-sample’ predictions we can calculate the
probability of the coalition obtaining a majority of seats in parliament necessary to con-
tinue in office. As this year’s change to the electoral system in Germany largely eliminates
distortions of the vote-seat relationship arising from so called ‘Überhangmandate’ we only
have to worry about the votes obtained by parties that will not be represented in parlia-
ment. Polling prior to the election suggested that about 8%64 to 9.5%65 of votes would
go to the Pirates, Alternative für Deutschland and other fringe parties that would likely
not exceed the 5% threshold. We assumed that the FDP and Die Linke would clear the
threshold. Die Linke was consistently well above 5-percent while the FDP would, so we
thought, again profit from ‘rental votes’ from CDU/CSU-voters which polls have diffi-
culty predicting. Of course, as we now know, the FDP stumbled on the 5% threshold.
We discuss this issue below.
Considering the substantial error in poll-based projections 2 months ahead of the elections
this gave us a range of 6 to 12 percentage points. If the polling for these minor parties was
correct, however, about 45.5% of the vote should suffice for Mrs. Merkel to continue the
coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP. Our point prediction already was above this threshold;
taking into account the statistical error inherent in the forecast, we predicted a 83%
probability that the outgoing coalition would have a majority in the next parliament.
In hindsight, the complex assumptions necessary to estimate this probability and the
fact that the FDP did not, in fact, obtain the minimal 5% vote share necessary to enter
parliament, may make our probability estimate seem overly naive as we discuss in section
6. However, the presentation of the election prediction as a probability is a useful exercise
64Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 24.07.2013, Infratest Dimap 25.07.2013
65Allensbach 12.07.2013
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Actual vote share Predicted vote share
Forecast
Vote share of outgoing governing coalitions and corresponding point predictions
from 'out-of-sample' prediction
because it emphasizes the uncertainty of the point prediction which might be missed if
only the point prediction is presented.
5 A comparative assessment
At first blush, our model seems to have fared well. Our prediction of a coalition vote
share of 47.05% deviated from the actual vote share (46.3%) by only 0.75 percentage
points. Whether this actually constitutes a success, however, depends on the performance
of the comparison models. We assess the performance of both our model and of the
benchmarked growth variable in three ways. Comparing the performance of our model
to a variant replacing benchmarked with non-benchmarked growth (i.e., German GDP
growth ) enables a direct comparison of benchmarked and non-benchmarked growth, both
as a predictor and in forecast errors (section 5.1). Of course, a model that surpassed its
non-benchmarked alternative specification but did a poor job of predicting the election
20
would not necessarily be of much use. We therefore place our benchmarking model’s
performance in context by comparing it to other forecasts of the 2013 election and the
final election polls, two days before the election (section 5.2).
5.1 A forecast with non-benchmarked growth
To assess whether benchmarked growth is a superior predictor to real growth in GDP
– probably the most common economic measure in structural election forecasting mod-
els – we compare two forms of our model, one with benchmarked growth and one with
non-benchmarked growth in German real GDP. We are wary about over-drawing conclu-
sions based on the small sample size, the results are nevertheless informative, given the
constraints of the data.
benchmarked not benchmarked
Previous Vote Share 1.025∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗
(0.0544) (0.163)












2013 Forecast 47.05 45.79
N 9 9
R2 0.993 0.978
adj. R2 0.986 0.956
Table 3: A comparison of benchmarked and non-benchmarked
growth. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p <
0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Benchmarked growth reveals a stronger effect than its non-benchmarked growth, as shown
in Table 5.1, associating a unit change with correspondingly larger increase (.93 v. .69) in
predicted vote share for the coalition. Benchmarked growth is also more precisely estim-
ated than its non-benchmarked counterpart. But how did the models fare in predicting
out-of-sample elections?
When all elections are predicted, one-by-one, out of sample, benchmarked growth outper-
forms its non-benchmarked alternative: When growth is benchmarked, the mean average
error (MAE) and root mean squared error (RMSE) of the model were 48% and 57% as
large, respectively, as when it was not. In other words, the forecast error from the model
with the non-benchmarked growth was over twice as large (2.09 v. 1.01) when measured
as MAE and 1.74 times as large measured as RMSE.
For the 2013 election, the point forecasts from both models deviated from from the
final outcome by less than a percentage point. While the forecast error from the non-
benchmarked model was even slightly smaller than that from the benchmarked model
they were not statistically distinguishable from each other at normal significance levels.
We further note that the non-benchmarked growth model predicts a smaller vote share
than the original model and actually underestimates the actual result. This suggests
that in contexts such as the 2013 German election, when Germany had sluggish growth
compared to prior periods but relatively high growth rates when compared to other
Eurozone economies, using non-benchmarked growth may underestimate the popularity
of the government.
In sum, while non-benchmarked growth actually produced a slightly more accurate pre-
diction for 2013, benchmarked growth produced more accurate out-of-sample predictions
in most of the other eight elections, yielding an average prediction error roughly half the
size of that from the non-benchmarked model.
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5.2 Other forecasts and polls
Let us also benchmark our benchmarking model. It is informative to see how a simple
structural forecasting model with benchmarked growth performs relative to one with
non-benchmarked growth. But this comparison would be of less interest if both models
predicted poorly relative to other approaches. How did our benchmarking model fare
relative to other forecasts estimated well before the election and polls taken nearly on its
eve?
Our forecast put the outgoing coalition government of CDU/CSU and FDP at 47.05%
of the popular vote – quite close to the 46.3% it actually obtained.66 This makes our
forecast one of the most accurate among the forecasts that were released prior to the
election. Only one other forecast67 provided similar accuracy. Our forecast was also on
par or slightly more accurate than the last poll results collected only two days before the
election (for a quick comparison of forecasts, final polls and results see Table 4). It also
bested averages of pre-election polls, as well as average predictions of expert assessments
and prediction markets. These have been calculated by68 for his ‘PollyVote’ forecast. It
is produced through calculation of simple averages of the forecasts in four categories of
forecasts: polls, prediction markets, expert judgment and quantitative models. Graefe
also calculates the overall average across the categories.
He explicitly calculates simple averages because as he argues there are no advantages in
terms of accuracy in using more complicated averaging procedures. The idea behind aver-
aging over different forecasting methods is that no individual method that the PollyVote
model relies on is consistently better than the other. In fact, in an analysis of six elections
from 1992 to 201269 found that ‘methods that provided the most accurate forecasts in one
66Taking the additional step of assuming FDP inclusion in the next parliament and estimating the
coalition reelection probability appears, in retrospect, to have been less well advised.
67Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck, ‘A Political-Economy Forecast for the 2013 German Elec-
tions’.
68Andreas Graefe. ‘German Election Forecasting: Comparing and Combining Methods for 2013’. In:
German Politics forthcoming (2015).
69Graefe et al., ‘Combining forecasts’.
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election were often among the least accurate in another election.’ For 2013 the PollyVote
aggregate was more accurate than any of the four component methods, however it was
not the single most accurate model. Thus, overall, our benchmarking model fared well
but we need to acknowledge that there is no guarantee that it will remain as accurate
in the future.





































































































MAE - .75 4.9 1.82 2.82 .84 .89 .89
Numbers in parentheses indicate difference to official results.
5.3 Other assessment criteria
Accuracy, of course, is not the only criterion in assessing which forecast fared best.
Forecast assessment is multifaceted and many other criteria demand consideration.70
Parsimony, forecasting with a small number of predictors, is valuable where observations
70Michael S. Lewis-Beck. ‘Election forecasting: principles and practice’. In: The British Journal of
Politics & International Relations 7.2 (2005), pp. 145–164.
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are scarce. Lead time – how far ahead of the election the forecast is estimated – is another
quite important criterion that we consider in our comparative assessment. After all, what
is a forecast worth that is dead accurate but issued only a day before the election? A
forecast that is, say, two percentage points off but published three months ahead of the
election can arguably be considered a better forecast. There is a tradeoff between lead
time and accuracy and people will disagree what constitutes the optimal balance between
the two. For this reason, we refrain from presenting a ranking of forecasts. Rather we
summarize how the different forecasts performed on all the relevant criteria (see Table
5).
Figure 4: Timeline of election forecasts
Kayser & Leininger
Norpoth & Gschwend (Zeit Blog 2013b)
Norpoth & Gschwend (Zeit Blog 2013a)






















Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
2013
FG Wahlen Forsa Allensbach
Election Outcome Forecasts
Note: Forecasts indicate earliest date that forecast could have been made. For example,
although Peter Selb and Simon Munzert. Forecasting the 2013 Bundestag Election Using Data
from Various Polls. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2313845. Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network, Aug. 2013 published their forecast in August they use polling up to
February of the election year. Their forecast could therefore have been made as early as
February.
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Another feature of election forecasting models that we consider is unique to election
forecasts for multi-party systems: the number of vote shares forecast. We predicted only
the combined vote share of the parties in the outgoing coalition, CDU, CSU and FDP.
Therefore, we were not able to predict the FDP’s dropping out of the Bundestag. Models
such as those by Selb and Munzert and Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck seem
in principle to enjoy an advantage in that regard, although both models predicted the
FDP at above 5%. Intuitively, there is more potential for error when predicting multiple
vote shares. To provide a fair comparison of the accuracy of the models we compare their
mean absolute errors (MAE). The model by71 has the greatest lead but an MAE of 2.82
71Selb and Munzert, Forecasting the 2013 Bundestag Election Using Data from Various Polls.
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percentages points. Our model has the smallest MAE of .75 percentage points but we also
have the smallest lead of just one and a half months and we only predict coalition vote
share. Considering that the forecasts were made months ahead of the election we believe
all of the forecasting models compare quite well to the last pre-election polls issued only
days before the election. These were quite accurate but they have practically no lead
time (see Table 4).
One model can provide different forecasts, so can have multiple different lead times. For
instance Norpoth and Gschwend provided three forecasts in 2013 based on updated data
on their poll-based predictor variable chancellor popularity. The limiting factor in our
model is also a poll-based variable, party identification in our case. As we published our
forecast in early August we chose to incorporate the latest available data. We conducted
several out-of-sample forecasts, post-hoc varying the lead time, and found that the average
forecasting error tends to increase with lead time. For future elections we could provide
monthly updates to our forecast by changing the measure of party identification – by
adding the newest Politbarometer month to the average and dropping the last – with the
promise of increasing the accuracy of our forecast as the election draws nearer. Structural
models also provide the opportunity to calculate scenarios. Instead of waiting for new
data to come in one can use a range of likely values to calculate corresponding forecasts.
6 Discussion: Election Forecasting in Germany
The 2013 election exposed two problems with forecasting models that focus on coalition
vote share. First, estimating the probability of a government remaining in power is
considerably more difficult than providing a point estimate of its vote share. For the
former one has to identify a vote threshold that will likely guarantee a parliamentary
majority. We estimated this threshold to be 45.5% given the likely vote shares to be
obtained by parties not surpassing the 5% threshold. However to calculate this threshold
we ultimately had to rely on the polls that we aimed to outperform. Second, as we did
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not forecast individual party vote shares, we again had to rely on polls to gauge the
likelihood of all coalition parties re-entering parliament. Based on our point prediction
we calculated a 83% probability that the outgoing coalition will have a majority in the
next parliament. We calculated that probability as a one-sided hypothesis test, treating
the effective threshold of 45.5% as null hypothesis. We naively put the FPD’s probability
of making the threshold at 1, which is obviously wrong as we now know. In hindsight
we believe we could have done better. Rather than taking the polls at face value we
should have, as one always should with polling data, accounted for the random error. We
should have calculated the probability of the FDP surpassing the threshold and included
that information in calculating the probability of the government continuing. Models
such as those provided by72 and73 have a clear advantage in that regard as they provide
predictions for all parties.
This election also posed a unique challenge to all election forecasters due to the change
in the apportionment system. A reform mandated by Germany’s constitutional court
eliminated the so-called Überhangmandate, drastically reducing the incentive for stra-
tegic voting. Without the reform, forecasts would likely have been more accurate. The
reduction of split-ticket voting74 also goes towards explaining the increased accuracy of
pre-election polling.
Minor parties pose another challenge to election forecasters and not only in multi-party
systems – think of third party candidates in the US. They matter more, however, in
multi-party systems. Forecasts of US presidential elections usually predict the incumbent
party’s share of the two-party popular vote (rather than of the total vote) to account for
third party candidates taking some of the vote which in the end is politically inconsequen-
tial. Forecasters of German Bundestag elections could similarly forecast the in-Bundestag
72Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck, ‘A Political-Economy Forecast for the 2013 German Elec-
tions’.
73Selb and Munzert, Forecasting the 2013 Bundestag Election Using Data from Various Polls.
74Kathleen Bawn. ‘Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and
Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany’. In: British Journal of Political Science 29.03
(1999), pp. 487–505.
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vote share, the incumbent coalition’s vote share relative to the vote share obtained by
all parties surpassing the 5%-threshold needed to be represented in the Bundestag. Such
forecasts would be hard to communicate to the public as coverage of the horse race fo-
cuses on overall vote share. Presenting such forecasts in seat shares – especially since the
reform of the electoral systems promises to make vote share more proportional to seat
share – might be more viable.
Another complication that also applies to election forecasts beyond Germany arises from
small sample size. For a good forecast we want the error around the prediction to be
as small as possible – it should be comparable to confidence intervals in survey research.
Given the low number of post-war elections, a forecasting model, besides having all
coefficients significant, needs a good fit. Most forecasting models haven an R2 well above
.9. However, also due to the low number of observations, one runs the risk of over-fitting
the model – fitting some of the random noise inherent in elections. Striking a balance
between tightly fitting and over-fitting the model is a challenge that seems to be as much
art as science.
These problems decrease only slightly with every additional Bundestag election held. Yet,
there are alternatives to waiting four years for the next election to expand one’s dataset
by one observation. Several authors estimate forecasting models at the district and state
level and aggregate the results up to arrive at a national prediction.7576 presents the first
attempt at constituency-level election forecasting for Germany. Such an approach has
certain advantages. In the US the winner of the popular vote might be the loser of the
Electoral College vote, which is precisely what happened to Al Gore in 2000. Furthermore,
not just national but also regional factors determine national election outcomes and
combining district or state time-series yields a much larger dataset allowing the estimation
75Carl E. Klarner. ‘State-Level Forecasts of the 2012 Federal and Gubernatorial Elections’. en.
In: PS: Political Science & Politics 45.04 (Oct. 2012), pp. 655–662; Bruno Jerôme and Véronique
Jerôme-Speziari. ‘Forecasting the 2012 US Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State Political
Economy Model’. en. In: PS: Political Science & Politics 45.04 (Oct. 2012), pp. 663–668.
76Simon Munzert. ‘A Methodological Framework for Constituency-Level Election Forecasting’. In:
Working Paper (2015).
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of more complex models. These reasons in part also apply to the German context as voters
vote for regional not national party lists and seat shares are allocated at the regional
level. Disaggregating to a lower level also allows forecasters to account for regional
peculiarities, for instance the CSU in Bavaria or the strong performance of Die Linke in
Eastern Germany (or greater number of protest voters in Eastern Germany).
6.1 Election Forecasting: what is it good for?
Election forecast are not without criticism. Particularly structural models like ours which
are macro-level models of what in the end is an individual-level act – voting – are the
object of criticism. They are estimated from small samples and rely on the assumption
of time-invariant effects. Therefore, they seem destined to go wrong or require ad-hoc
fixes, that may seem arbitrary, if circumstances change..
Such has been the topic of a debate between77 and78 in a 2005 post-election issue of
Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Klein criticizes Norpoth and Gschwend for a one-time
correction to their model, adjusting one variable to account for the emergence of a new
electoral coalition between the WASG and PDS. They were succesful in doing so, missing
the actual result by just 0.3%-points. While Norpoth and Gschwend see it as merely ‘a
practical adjustment that does not invalidate the logic of the model,’ Klein is more critical.
He contends that Norpoth and Gschwend’s 2005 forecast can not be considered a success
but rather reveals that their model is not capable of producing universally valid forecasts
criticizing their ‘ad-hoc’ adjustment on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We see
Klein’s contribution as targeted critique of Norpoth and Gschwend’s model adjustment
rather than a general attack on forecasting.
Without commenting on the debate, we think that something valuable can be learned. It
77Markus Klein. ‘Die Zauberformel. Über das erfolgreiche Scheitern des Prognosemodells von
Gschwend und Norpoth bei der Bundestagswahl 2005’. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46.4 (2005),
pp. 689–691.
78Thomas Gschwend and Helmut Norpoth. ‘Prognosemodell auf dem Prüfstand: Die Bundestagswahl
2005’. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46.4 (2005), pp. 682–688.
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seems that the popularity of the head of government is less predictive of the vote in a more
fractionalized party system. This hypothesis derived from a forecasting model could be
tested in a more standard systematic way. In fact, we do argue that as political scientists
we can learn something from forecasting models even when they fail, or particularly when
they do. Theoretically informed forecasts provide a baseline (a sort of expected normal
vote) against which the actual election can be judged, so even if a forecast is off sometimes
it will have explanatory value.
Our model also fares least well in predicting the 2005 election – the forecast is off by
about positive 2%-points. We should add that the 2005 election was also considered a
debacle for polling as polling companies missed the result by a wide margin, particularly
polls overestimated the CDU vote share by more than 5%-points.79 One should thus ask
what could have made 2005 such an apparently special unpredictable election. Structural
forecasting models like ours provide a heuristic to address such questions. We discuss two
aspects that are particular about the 2005 election. Firstly, it was an early election called
by then chancellor Gerhard Schröder after the SPD lost the state elections in Germany’s
most populous state, North Rhine-Westphalia, earlier in the year. Secondly, the 2005
election saw for the first time an electoral alliance of the PDS and the newly founded
WASG formed just months before the election.
We rule out the early election as cause for the relatively large prediction error in our
model, although it could pose problems to our measure of term length. The election of
2005 has not been the first early election in Germany. In our time-series the elections
of 1983 and 1990 have both been early elections, both taking place roughly three rather
than the usual four years after the last election. 2005 is thus not a one time deviation.
Also, if at all, the early election should have led us to underpredict the vote share. We use
79Lena-Maria Schaffer and Gerald Schneider. ‘Die Prognosegüte von Wahlbörsen und Meinungsum-
fragen zur Bundestagswahl 2005’. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46.4 (2005), pp. 674–681; Thomas
Plischke and Hans Rattinger. ‘Zittrige Wählerhand oder invalides Messinstrument? Zur Plausibilität
von Wahlprojektionen am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2005’. de. In: Wahlen und Wähler. Ed. by
Oscar W. Gabriel, Bernhard Weßels and Jürgen W. Falter. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009,
pp. 484–509.
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the log count of terms to measure declining support for the government over time, which
might actually be a continous process better measured in say months. If this is the case
our model would have predicted too high a term-length penalty because the government
did not use its full term in office.
We think the emergence of the electoral alliance of PDS and WASG is the most likely
culprit.80 adjust their model to account for the new electoral alliance by subtracting the
share of vote intentions for the new electoral alliance from the share of people favoring
the chancellor. They argue that this correction is necessary to avoid overstating the vote
intentions for the SPD based on chancellor popularity. They say that all voters intending
to vote for the PDS/WASG should favor Schröder over Merkel but they will nevertheless
not vote for the SPD. A similar argument might apply to our party identification measure.
We think it likely that in 2005, exclusively because of the relatively recent emergence of
the WASG/PDS alliance, a party identification for the SPD was less indicative of a vote
for the SPD than it would usually be. We therefore overestimated the coalitions vote
share (combined vote share of SPD and Greens) for our 2005 prediction.
A last comment concerns the use of economic data. We use benchmarked growth, as
explained above, Jérôme and co-authors use unemployment figures. The use of economic
measures in election forecasting models is common practice. It is based on economic
voting research that found that voters’ evaluations of recent economic developments in-
fluence their voting decisions.81 We do know that the state of the economy matters
for voting, however we know less about how voters learn about the economy. We use
benchmarked growth because we believe that voters learn about the economy primarily
through the media and that the media report more positively on the economy when it is
outperforming that of comparison countries as argued by.82 However, how voters learn
about the economy is almost never explicitly addressed in the election forecasting liter-
80Gschwend and Norpoth, ‘Prognosemodell auf dem Prüfstand’.
81Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra. ‘Retrospective Voting Reconsidered’. In: Annual Review of
Political Science 16.1 (May 2013), pp. 285–306.
82Kayser and Peress, ‘Benchmarking across Borders’.
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ature. As83 point out, when fitting models, most forecasters unwittingly assume that the
actual state of the economy, a state best estimated by the multiple revisions to official
macroeconomic statistics that occur after their initial release, drives voter behavior.
7 Conclusion
The field of election forecasting is changing rapidly. Older ‘structural’ or ‘political eco-
nomy’ models of forecasting, such as our benchmarking model, are losing ground to
poll-averaging techniques and synthetic models that combine polls and fundamentals.84
Although polls are snapshots in time rather than true forecasts, the public often treat
them as prognostications.85 In the run-up to the 2012 US presidential election, poll
averaging proved impressively accurate with at least four prominent poll aggregators86
correctly predicting the winner in all or nearly all 50 states accurately, sometimes months
in advance of the election.87 Synthetic models that combine elements such as structural
forecasts, polls and sometimes even expert predictions have also proliferated and excelled
both for US88 and European89 forecasts. Such developments rightfully beg the question
of whether structural forecasts with their obvious shortcomings – limited degrees of free-
dom and macro-level modeling of micro-level decisions, and a spotty forecasting record90 –
83Kayser and Leininger, ‘Vintage Errors’.
84Drew A Linzer. ‘The Future of Election Forecasting: More Data, Better Technology’. In: PS:
Political Science & Politics 47.02 (2014), pp. 326–328.
85Hillygus, ‘The Evolution of Election Polling in the United States’.
86Simon Jackman, Drew Linzer, Nate Silver and Sam Wang
87Mark Blumenthal. ‘Polls, forecasts, and aggregators’. In: PS: Political Science & Politics 47.02
(2014), pp. 297–300; Simon Jackman. ‘The predictive power of uniform swing’. In: PS: Political Science
& Politics 47.02 (2014), pp. 317–321; WM Traugott. ‘Public opinion polls and election forecasting’. In:
PS: Political Science & Politics 47.2 (2014), pp. 342–344.
88Drew A Linzer. ‘Dynamic Bayesian forecasting of presidential elections in the States’. In: Journal
of the American Statistical Association 108.501 (2013), pp. 124–134; Erikson and Wlezien, ‘Forecasting
US presidential elections using economic and noneconomic fundamentals’.
89Andreas Graefe. ‘German Election Forecasting: Comparing and Combining Methods for 2013’. In:
German Politics (Forthcoming 2015). eprint: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2015.1024240;
Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, ‘Forecasting elections in Europe: Synthetic models’.
90James E Campbell. ‘Forecasting the 2012 American national elections’. In: PS: Political Science
& Politics 45.04 (2012), pp. 610–613; Benjamin E Lauderdale and Drew A Linzer. ‘Under-performing,
Over-performing, or Just Performing? The Limitations of Fundamentals-based Presidential Election
Forecasting’. In: Unpublished manuscript (2014).
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serve any role beyond contributing inputs into synthetic models. For example, Nate,91 not
a stickler for theory, dismisses ‘fundamentals-based’ models as poor predictors compared
to synthetic models that combine polls and economic data. For one purpose, however,
structural models remain uncontested: testing explicit models of voter behavior. Polls,
aggregated or not, do not even attempt to understand why voters behave as they do;
they only measure sentiment.
Predictive validity is a hallmark of science and one of the most demanding tests of a
model.92 We embraced the challenge of predicting the 2013 German Bundestag election
as an opportunity to test the hypothesis that voters benchmark domestic economic per-
formance against that abroad, which influences their support for the government. More
specifically, as93 argue and demonstrate, they unwittingly respond to ‘pre-benchmarking’
in which the media reports more positively on the economy when it outperforms that of
neighboring states.
Nearly two months ahead of the election we offered a theory-driven forecasting model pre-
dicting the outcome of the upcoming Bundestag election. Our model drew on previous
election outcomes, characteristics of the government and of voters and, most originally,
the relative economic performance of Germany in comparison to the three other most
important economies in Europe, France, the UK and Italy. We predicted that the outgo-
ing coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP would receive a vote share of 47.05% on September
22, 2013. They, in fact, received 46.3% making our forecast one of the most accurate
forecasts offered, besting even the final polls released two days before the election. No
less importantly, our forecast also proved considerably more accurate in out-of-sample
predictions of German Bundestag elections than an otherwise identical forecasting model
using non-benchmarked growth.
91Nate Silver. The signal and the noise: The art and science of prediction. Penguin UK, 2012, ch 2,
pp.67-68,
92Friedman, ‘The methodology of positive economics’; Rosenberg, Economics–Mathematical Politics
or Science of Diminishing Returns?
93Kayser and Peress, ‘Benchmarking across Borders’.
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The great advantage of structural forecasting models is that they explicitly subject the-
ories of voter behavior to one of the most difficult tests in science, prediction. The
hypothesis that the economic assessments that motivate vote choice are comparative,
i.e., benchmarked against economic performance abroad, has, at least for the 2013 an
prior elections, passed this this test.
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